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Abstract In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case of
complete information. In this context, since the negotiators know the value functions
of both parties, it is not difficult to calculate the Pareto efficient solutions for the nego-
tiation. Thus rational negotiators can reach agreement on this frontier. However, these
approaches are not applied in practice when complete information is not available. The
research question of our work is “It is possible to help negotiators achieving an efficient
solution in the absence of complete information regarding the different parameters of
the model?”. We propose to derive incomplete information about the preferences of
negotiators from the statements they make and the offers they exchange during the
negotiation process. We present and discuss three approaches that use this informa-
tion in order to help a mediator proposing a better solution than the compromise the
negotiators have reached or are close to reach.
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1 Introduction
In negotiations it is sometimes necessary to bring in the help of a third party, as a medi-
ator or an arbitrator. A mediator is a person who should be acceptable, impartial, and
neutral who does not have the power to make decisions on behalf of the negotiators. A
mediator’s task is to assist the negotiating parties in establishing a positive climate and
reach a solution. An arbitrator is a neutral and impartial person who makes a decision
in the negotiation process by comparing previous results, using justice criteria or by
other methods. An arbitrator’s decision may be binding or not binding. In this paper,
we develop new methodologies to support a mediator or arbitrator in advising nego-
tiators [Raiffa’s externally prescriptive perspective (Raiffa et al. 2002)]. However,
the methodology developed in this work can also be adapted to support one of the
parties based on a description of the other party’s behavior (Raiffa’s asymmetrically
descriptive-prescriptive perspective).
In this work, we will be concerned with bilateral (two-party) negotiations. We con-
sider integrative negotiations over multiple issues, which are the ones most likely to
benefit from the efforts of a mediator. Integrative (or win-win) negotiation (see for
example Walton and McKersie 1965) assumes the integration of resources and capa-
bilities of parties to generate more value. This contrasts with distributive (or win-lose)
negotiation where the aim is typically the division of a single good and the main
concern of negotiators is to get the largest possible share of the “pie”. In integrative
negotiation, successful strategies include cooperation, information sharing and joint
resolution of problems. Mediation and arbitration are particularly useful in integrative
negotiation, since they can help negotiators to identify potential areas of improvement
for both sides.
A typical form of negotiation is the “dance of packages” (Raiffa et al. 2002), in
which offers and counter-offers are successively presented by both parties. Imagine
that party 1 prepares a proposal that he finds appealing and hopes the party 2 would
accept. Then, party 2 will answer with a proposal of his own. As one would expect,
party 1’s initial proposal might be wonderful for party 1 and unacceptable for party
2. The counter-offers from party 2 might have the opposite characteristics. Now there
are two proposals on the table, and each side describes the merits of its own offer
and possibly criticizes the other. The dance of the packages proceeds by making con-
cessions seeking a compromise. In a variation of this procedure, both parties might
simultaneously put offers on the table.
According to Raiffa et al. (2002), integrative negotiation requires constructing and
evaluating proposals covering various issues. This process entails the identification of
issues to solve, the specification of the possible levels of resolution for each issue, and
the specification of the scores of each possible combination of levels. Scores can be
obtained through an aggregation method, e.g. the additive value model (Raiffa et al.
2002). A value-based evaluation model allows each party to evaluate their potential
own proposals, proposals made by the other party, and their BATNA (best alternative
to a negotiated agreement).
In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, literature often considers the case of complete
information. If the mediator knows the value functions of both parties, then he can
calculate the set of Pareto efficient solutions and suggest an agreement from this
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set. A solution is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to improve the position of one
party without worsening the value to one of the other parties. The choice among the
Pareto efficient solutions can be based on additional criteria like the fairness of the
proposed compromise. However, in real negotiations, neither the parties nor the medi-
ator have complete information about the preferences of all parties (see for example
Lai et al. 2006). In many cases, parties might not even have complete information
about the parameters describing their own preferences, because the assumption that
parameter values can be precisely elicited is often unrealistic (see for example Dias
and Clímaco 2000; Lahdelma et al. 2003; Weber 1987). For a mediator in a nego-
tiation, obtaining information about the value functions of the parties is even more
difficult, since parties might strategically distort the preference information they pro-
vide (Vetschera 2005). To support mediators in their task, it it therefore necessary
to consider methods which are based on incomplete or imprecise information about
preferences.
In this paper we assume that the preferences of both parties can be roughly modeled
by an additive value function, as in Raiffa’s Negotiation Analysis (Raiffa et al. 2002).
However, we do not make the assumption that each party’s value function is precisely
known, i.e., we will not assume that the parties will indicate explicitly and exactly the
parameter values that fully define their model. Although we do not assume complete
information, we assume that at least some information about preferences is available.
This information can come from one of two sources: it can be obtained implicitly by
observing the offers or the decisions of the parties, or it can be explicitly provided
by the negotiators. In both cases, we will assume that the information is provided in
the form of comparisons of proposals that are implicitly or explicitly made by the
parties, rather than by direct specification of utility functions, issue weights or other
parameters.
Some approaches in the literature deal with incomplete information in the context
of negotiation problems (see, for example, Clímaco and Dias 2006; Ehtamo et al. 1999;
Heikanen 1999; Lai et al. 2006; Lai and Sycara 2009). The importance of preference
information is quite clearly mentioned in most of the negotiation literature. An impor-
tant objective in negotiation processes is to achieve an integrative solution, which
improves the position of both parties with respect to the present situation. According
to the Dual Concern model (Pruitt 1983; Thomas 1992), these solutions can only be
achieved if negotiators have a high concern about both their own preferences and the
preferences of their opponents. This requires that they also have information about
the opponent’s preferences. Typically, this information is not complete (Vetschera
2009).
For negotiation processes with incomplete information on weights, Clímaco and
Dias (2006) proposed an extension of the methodology of the software VIP-G (Dias
and Clímaco 2005). Their method is based on relaxing the set of weights each actor
accepts and defining convergence paths in the weights space. Lai et al. (2006) pre-
sented a model for situations where information is incomplete, the value functions
are not linear and are not explicitly known. The authors refer that one of the main
problems associated with multi-attribute negotiation is the difficulty of making deci-
sions in an n-dimension space. To reduce this problem, a process was proposed that
enables negotiators, in each period, to negotiate based on a single line, with the help
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of a mediator. Though it is not difficult to involve such a mediator in automated nego-
tiations between software agents, there may exist situations where a mediator is not
trusted or cannot be implemented. Thus, Lai and Sycara (2009) focused on developing
mechanisms for Pareto-efficient multi-attribute negotiations without the presence of a
mediator.
Ehtamo et al. (1999) presented a class of methods called constraint proposal meth-
ods, which are interactive methods to find Pareto efficient solutions through com-
mon tangent hyperplanes. This process supports negotiations of two parties about
two or more continuous issues. A mediator tries to find a hyperplane, through
some reference points, so that the most preferred alternatives of both parties in this
hyperplane coincide. Heikanen (1999) proposed an interactive process to determine
Pareto efficient solutions in negotiations with multiple parties about continuous
issues, with help from a mediator. This method does not require that negotiators
know the value functions of other parties or that the mediator knows all the value
functions.
Our paper extends these existing lines of research in several directions. While most
existing literature proposes one approach to deal with the problem of incomplete infor-
mation, we systematically develop and compare three new approaches to support a
mediator under incomplete information: the first is based on robust conclusions, the
second is based on inferred approximations, and the third uses a domain-based analy-
sis. These approaches will allow the mediator to assess how each proposal he may put
forward would be received by the parties, namely if they would consider it as better
than the ones they have already considered (or even accepted as a compromise), and
to know which would be the most promising proposals according to some arbitra-
tion criteria. We also consider different levels of incomplete information, in particular
the case where some parameters of the evaluation model are known (value functions,
weights of the value functions), and the case where no parameters of the model are
exactly known.
We envision two scenarios in which our methods could be applied:
1. The parties have reached a potential compromise and want to improve it.
2. The parties have not (yet) reached a compromise. There are two offers on the
table, which provide different utilities to the two parties.
In the latter case, each party can at least obtain the value which it would
receive from the current offer made by the opponent. We therefore consider the
value levels offered to the other side by each parties’ proposal as the status quo
in such negotiations. Our approaches therefore are applicable both to improve
upon successful negotiations (to check whether the parties “left money on the
table”), and to find a potential compromise in negotiations which otherwise might
fail.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we will present a general framework
for negotiations under incomplete information. In Sect. 3 we will propose three differ-
ent approaches to suggest potential agreements. In Sect. 4 we will present an illustrative
example using the approaches presented in Sect. 3. We will finish in Sect. 5 with some
conclusions and thoughts on future research.
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2 A Framework for Negotiations Under Incomplete Information
2.1 Information Levels
In this paper, we consider several different levels of information about the negotia-
tors’ preferences over multiple issues that might be available to an outside mediator.
To formally characterize this information, we chose an approach similar to Raiffa
et al. (2002) and assume that the true (but unknown) preferences of a negotiator can
be represented by an additive value function of the form
V k(x (i)) =
n∑
j=1
V kj (x
(i)) = wk1vk1(x (i)1 ) + wk2vk2(x (i)2 ) + · · · + wknvkn(x (i)n ) (1)
where V kj (x
(i)) = wkjvkj (x (i)j ), vkj (x (i)j ) represents the value of the alternative x (i)
(a potential compromise) in the j th issue and wkj represents the scale coefficient or
“weight” of the value function vkj (.), for party k, and n represents the number of issues.
Without loss of generality, we further assume that the value function is standardized
so that:
0 ≤ wkj ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . n and
n∑
j=1
wkj = 1 (2)
and
0 ≤ vkj (x (i)j ) ≤ 1. (3)
An additive value function imposes certain restrictions on the preferences that can
be represented, most notably preferential independence between the issues being con-
sidered (Keeney and Raiffa 1976; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). While the
additive form allows us some simplifications in the models we are going to formulate
(like the use of linear programming rather than nonlinear programming), our approach
does not rely very strongly on additivity of the value function. With some straightfor-
ward adaptations, it can also be extended to other forms like bilinear or multilinear
functions (Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
Function (1) allows for a classification of different types of information levels. As a
benchmark, we consider the case of complete information in which all components of
the value function are assumed to be known. By relaxing this assumption, we consider
two possible levels of incomplete information:
1. The weights wkj are unknown, while the values v
k
j (x
(i)
j ) are known.
2. Both weights and values are unknown, and only very general assumptions about
the shape of the value function vkj (x
(i)
j ) are made.
In case 2, we restrict possible value functions by a lower and an upper bound. If
we can exclude increasing marginal values (which is reasonable and can easily be
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Fig. 1 Shape of a value function
of the issue price (for a seller)
assessed by asking simple questions to each party) the lower bound will be formed by
the linear function:
vlin(x (i)j ) =
x j − x j
x j − x j (4)
where x j and x j represent the best and worst possible outcome in attribute x j ,
respectively. The upper bound will be formed by a concave value function:
vcon(x
(i)
j ) = a + b(−e−c∗x
(i)
j ) (5)
where parameters a and b are chosen to scale the function to values between zero
and one, and parameter c determines the degree of concavity of the function. Values
are thus restricted to vlin(x (i)j ) ≤ vˆ(x (i)j ) ≤ vcon(x (i)j ), where we use vˆ to indicate
that this is an approximation of the unknown true value. For example, in Fig. 1 we
would assume that m ≤ vˆprice(11) ≤ M . It should be noted that utility values are only
assumed to lie in the interval between the linear and the concave function as shown in
Fig. 1. We do not assume that the “true” value function itself has a particular shape or
functional form.
2.2 Representation of Incomplete Information
In the two cases outlined above, the mediator is not necessarily completely ignorant
about the weights and/or values, but might be able to get at least some information
about them. Such information can be obtained in two ways: (i) it can explicitly be
provided by the negotiators, or (ii) it can be inferred from observing their behavior
during the process of the negotiation, in particular from the offers that each of them
makes and their reactions to offers from the opponent.
In both cases, the information obtained by the mediator is most likely in the form
of statements of preference or indifference between alternatives, where each alter-
native is characterized by a value for each issue. If information is directly provided
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by the negotiators, the mediator could ask negotiators whether they would consider
another alternative to be about as good as a proposed alternative. Whenever the medi-
ator makes a proposal, he could also ask if this proposal is indeed better than an
offer already on the table, thus inferring the direction of preference between these two
alternatives.
In a concession-based negotiation process as represented by the “dance of pack-
ages”, preferences between alternatives can also be inferred from the offers made by
negotiators during the process (Vetschera 2009). For instance, in a scenario where the
negotiators have already reached a tentative compromise and wish to improve upon
it, one can safely assume that a negotiator will prefer that compromise to all other
offers made by the opponent during the negotiation. Otherwise, it would in most cases
be possible to revert to that previous offer from the opponent (which the opponent
could hardly reject, since it was him who originally proposed it). Furthermore, in
a dance of packages negotiation process, negotiators typically start with offers very
favorable to themselves and then successively make concessions in the course of the
negotiation. Thus we can assume that a negotiator prefers all offers made by himself
to the compromise and also prefers his earlier offers to the offers he made later in the
process. From transitivity, it also follows that a negotiator will prefer all offers made
by himself to all offers made by the opponent. This last condition can also be utilized
if no compromise has been reached (yet).
Information about preferences of negotiators will therefore be available in the form
of statements of preference or indifference between alternatives. Assuming an additive
value function, the statement that alternative x (1) is preferred to alternative x (2) can be
represented by the condition (see, e.g., Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos 1982; Vetschera
2009):
n∑
j=1
V kj
(
x
(1)
j
)
≥
n∑
j=1
V kj
(
x
(2)
j
)
, (6)
while a statement of indifference can be represented by the constraint
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
V kj
(
x
(1)
j
)
−
n∑
j=1
V kj
(
x
(2)
j
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤  (7)
where  is a suitably small tolerance value.
The specification of V kj depends on the information level being considered. For the
case of unknown weights and known values, it is defined as
V kj
(
x
(i)
j
)
= wkjvkj
(
x
(i)
j
)
(8)
i.e. the unknown weight is combined with the known value function of negotiator k. In
this case, the constraints are linear in the weights and define a feasible set of weights
Wk (a polytope) which can be considered as the set of possible preference parameters
of negotiator k.
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In the second case, with unknown weights and unknown values, the values for
V kj (x
(i)
j ) can directly be used as variables in the model, as in Greco et al. (2008). Let
s j denote the number of different values for x (i)j considering all the potential alterna-
tives. Let us define a vector of s1 +· · ·+ sn variables vki, j = V kj (x (i)j ). These variables
can be used in constraints of type (6) and (7). Furthermore, if xkj represents the best
possible outcome in attribute x j for party k, then considering vkj (x
k
j ) = 1 we will have
V kj (x
k
j ) = wkj .
If we assume that values are ordered in decreasing order of preference, i.e. that vk1, j
represents V kj (x
k
j ), we can express (2) as:
1 ≥ wkj = vk1, j > vk2, j > · · · > vks j , j = 0 and
n∑
j=1
vk1, j = 1. (9)
Thus, we are dealing with linear problems even in the case where both the weights
and the values are unknown.
If the value function for each attribute is assumed to be known, the constraints (6),
(7), and (2) (plus possibly other ones) define a polytope Wk of admissible weights. In
the case of unknown value functions, the constraints (6), (7), and (9) (plus possibly
other ones) define a feasible set of values we denote by Mk (also a polytope). In either
case, the polytope can be considered as the set of possible preference parameters of
negotiator k. It should be noted that we assume here that all actions of a negotia-
tor, and all preference statements provided by a negotiator, are consistent with a true
value function of the form (1). If this is not the case, and constraints derived from the
negotiator’s choices contradict each other, these sets might become empty.
In the next section will use the general notation (w, v) ∈ (Wk, Mk) to indicate that:
(w, v) ∈ (Wk, Mk) ⇔
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(
wk1, . . . , w
k
n
) ∈ Wk if vkj (.) is known.
(
vk1,1, . . . , v
k
s1,1, . . . , v
k
sn ,n
)
∈ Mk if vkj (.) is unknown.
(10)
2.3 Criteria for Selecting Alternative Solutions
Using information of one of the types presented above, the mediator can suggest
one or several alternative solutions to the negotiators. Proposals from the mediator
should have a high chance of being accepted by both parties, and also fulfill additional
mediation criteria. We start by defining these criteria, and will present three different
approaches to obtain such proposals in the next section.
The dominance criterion is a natural starting point in selecting proposals. If only
this criterion is used, the mediator could identify all alternatives which dominate the
currently proposed compromise x (c) or the status quo of the negotiation. In negotia-
tions which have not yet reached a compromise, the status quo consist of the utility
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values which offers from both sides provide to the recipient of the offer. Conversely,
alternatives which are dominated by the proposed compromise or the status quo can
be eliminated from further consideration.
Formally, let x (r) denote the reference (or reservation) point below which the nego-
tiators will not accept any alternative. If a compromise has been reached, then x (r) =
x (c). If a compromise has not been reached and the two last offers on the table are
x (o1) (offered by negotiator 1) and x (o2) (offered by negotiator 2), then x (r) will refer
to the point
(
V 1(x (o2)), V 2(x (o1))
)
in value space. Although
(
V 1(x (o2)), V 2(x (o1))
)
is
a fictitious alternative, it is not an utopian alternative which is better than any existing
one. By construction, this point is dominated by x (o1) and x (o2), so it makes sense to
search for other alternatives dominating it.
The alternatives to be proposed by the mediator should, for both negotiators, be
better than x (r). Since preference information is incomplete, one can distinguish here
between alternatives which definitely dominate x (r) (i.e. which are better for both
parties under all preference parameters still considered possible), alternatives which
possibly dominate x (r) (i.e. which are better for both parties for at least one vector
of preference parameters for each party), and alternatives that cannot dominate x (r)
because for at least one party, there is no vector of preference parameters for which it
is better than x (r).
As a second criterion, the alternatives to be proposed should also be Pareto efficient
concerning the value they yield to each party. Once again, under incomplete informa-
tion, we can distinguish between alternatives that are definitely efficient, alternatives
that are possibly efficient, and alternatives that cannot be efficient (because they are
definitely dominated by another alternative).
If the mediator wants to present only one (or a small number) of alternatives to
the parties, additional criteria can be used to guide this selection. Several such criteria
can be developed, depending on whether the mediator is more interested in finding
an efficient solution (which maximizes total value creation) or an equitable solution
(which tries to balance the interests of the parties involved). In this paper, we consider
the following mediation criteria (Raiffa et al. 2002):
1. The max-sum criterion, which maximizes the sum of values of both parties and
thus selects the alternative which is best according to total efficiency.
2. The max-min PoP criterion, which maximizes the minimum payoff, i.e. the payoff
to the negotiator who receives the lowest payoff from the negotiation result. To
make payoffs comparable between negotiators, they are standardized within the
possible range by calculating the Proportion of Potential (PoP).
Thus, the max-sum criterion selects the alternative which maximizes
V 1(x (i)) + V 2(x (i)) (11)
and the max-min PoP criterion maximizes
min
k
V k(x (i)) − V kmin
V kmax − V kmin
(12)
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where V kmax is the best payoff that negotiator k could achieve considering the set of
alternatives being considered, and V kmin is a lower limit on the payoffs considered for
negotiator k for the same set of alternatives. To ensure acceptability of the proposal,
we only consider alternatives which are at least as good as x (r) for both parties when
maximizing the criteria.
Naturally, other mediation criteria could be used, e.g., maximizing the product of
values exceeding x (r), which is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution using x (r)
as a disagreement point. Although generalization to those other criteria is straight-
forward, we will restrict our analysis in this paper to the max-sum criterion and the
max-min PoP criterion, because they lead to linear programming models, while other
criteria would require nonlinear models.
Considering incomplete information, we can again distinguish different classes
of alternatives: alternatives that are definitely optimal for a criterion (i.e. maximize
that criterion for all possible preference parameters), alternatives that are potentially
optimal (i.e. maximize the criterion for at least one vector of possible preference
parameters, while for some other possible parameter values, the maximum is obtained
at another alternative). Alternatives are called definitely non-optimal if no preference
parameter (w, v) ∈ (Wk, Mk) exists at which the alternative maximizes the criterion
under consideration.
3 Approaches to Suggest Potential Agreements
3.1 Extreme Parameters Approach
As a first approach, we formulate optimization models to identify alternatives for
which one of the mediator’s requirements described in the previous section definitely
holds, or definitely does not hold. An alternative definitely meets a certain require-
ment if that requirement is fulfilled for all possible parameter vectors. Similarly, an
alternative definitely does not meet a requirement if that requirement is not fulfilled for
any of the possible parameter vectors. This analysis is only concerned with one single
alternative at a time, other alternatives might exist that also fulfill the requirement.
We call this first method the “extreme parameters” approach, because we are looking
for parameter values which lie on the boundary of the feasible set, leading to extreme
value differences.
To find out whether an alternative is definitely better or definitely worse than the ref-
erence, a Linear Program (LP) can be solved. Recall that V k(x (i)) is the value of alter-
native x (i) for negotiator k (k = 1, 2). Let mki j denote the solution of the following LP:
max{V k(x (i)) − V k(x ( j))}
(w, v) ∈ (Wk, Mk) (13)
Whenever mki j < 0, there is no possible combination of parameters which would make
alternative x (i) at least as good as x ( j) for negotiator k, thus we can say that x ( j) is
definitely better than x (i) (or x (i) is definitely worse than x ( j)) with respect to the
available information about negotiator k’s preferences.
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Given the sets of feasible parameter values (W1, M1) and (W2, M2), it is possible
to determine, for each negotiator, which alternatives are definitely better than the ref-
erence point x (r) and which alternatives are definitely worse than the reference point.
The mediator would like to propose an alternative x (i) such that m1ri < 0 and m2ri < 0.
The problem is that it can happen that there are no alternatives that are definitely better
than the reference for both negotiators. Nevertheless, this approach is a good starting
point: if there are alternatives that are definitely worse than the reference for one of
the negotiators, then the mediator can discard these alternatives, i.e., we can eliminate
the alternatives x (i) for which m1ir < 0 or m
2
ir < 0. These calculations are analogous
to those proposed by Dias and Clímaco (2000) to obtain binary robust conclusions.
Hence, only the alternatives that are potentially at least as good as the reference for
both negotiators are candidates to be proposed to them.
The LP (13) can also be used to compare any other pairs of alternatives, besides
pairs containing the reference x (r). This allows to check for Pareto efficiency. For a
pair (x (i), x ( j)), if m1j i < 0 and m2j i < 0, then x ( j) is definitely worse than x (i) for
both negotiators and hence x ( j) is definitely not Pareto efficient. Thus, it can also be
discarded.
Let P denote the index set of the remaining candidate alternatives, after discarding
alternatives definitely worse than the reference point for any of the negotiators and
alternatives definitely not belonging to the Pareto frontier. To discriminate between
alternatives in P , the mediator might also try to identify which ones can be potentially
optimal according to a mediation criterion. For the max-sum criterion the following
LP is solved for each alternative x (i) ∈ P:
max δ
V 1(x (i)) + V ′2(x (i)) − [V 1(x ( j)) + V ′2(x ( j))] − δ ≥ 0,∀ j ∈ P, j 	= i
(w, v) ∈ (W1, M1)
(w′, v′) ∈ (W2, M2)
δ free
(14)
If this LP yields δ ≥ 0 at the optimal solution, then x (i) is potentially optimal accord-
ing to the max-sum criterion; otherwise, it cannot be the best alternative according
to that criterion. Furthermore, if an alternative is the only one for which a solution
with δ > 0 is obtained, that alternative is definitely optimal. Let us note that if we
tried to maximize the sum of the values, this would not lead to acceptable results
(for more details see Sarabando et al. 2009). To perform a similar analysis consider-
ing another mediation criteria requires introducing binary variables (for the criterion
of maximizing the minimum PoP) or nonlinear programming (for criteria involving
products).
3.2 Central Parameters Approach
A second approach the mediator might use to find good potential alternatives con-
sists in inferring a representative combination of parameter values from (W1, M1)
and (W2, M2). Using these surrogate parameter values, the mediator can identify
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alternatives that are better than the reference point for both negotiators, are efficient,
or are optimal according to a mediation criterion. Of course, the conclusions that hold
for such a surrogate parameter vector do not necessarily hold for the true parameter
values that would be obtained by a thorough and explicit utility elicitation process.
Nevertheless, studies in the context of additive value functions (e.g., Barron and Barrett
1996; Sarabando and Dias 2009) show that using a combination of parameter values
that is central to the feasible set yields good approximations. The more information
the mediator has, in terms of constraints to the parameter values, the more accurate
this approximation will be.
One possible approach to find a central combination of parameter values is to solve
a LP of the max-min type to find a point such that the smallest slack in a constraint
of the form (6) is as large as possible. This is an approach used for inferring parame-
ters of multicriteria aggregation approaches (e.g., Bous et al. 2010; Jacquet-Lagreze
and Siskos 1982; Mousseau and Dias 2004). Let Ak denote a coefficient matrix and
let bk denote a right-hand side vector such that (w, v) ∈ (Wk, Mk) if and only if
Ak .(w, v) ≤ bk . Let sk be a vector containing one constant per constraint, equal to 1
if the constraint is of type (6) and equal to 0 otherwise. The following LP can then
be used to infer a central parameter vector with respect to the inequality preference
statements, for k ∈ {1, 2}:
max k
Ak .(w, v) + skk ≤ bk (15)
The variables of this problem are the scalar k , which represents the smallest slack
to be maximized, the weights, and possibly the values. The optimal solution will be
a kind of “safest” vector, which is as far as possible from any boundary. Because of
that, our objective is to maximize the slack. Note that all constraints are formulated
in terms of the multi-attribute value function, which is scaled between zero and one,
and thus have a comparable magnitude. This makes it possible to compare deviations
across constraints without further rescaling.
A central combination of parameter values can also be found by computing the
centroid of (Wk, Mk) in an exact manner or using an approximation. Exact methods
exist for some types of polytopes (Solymosi and Dombi 1986). An approximation to
the centroid of any polytope can however be easily obtained using Monte-Carlo simu-
lation, as in the computation of central weights used in the SMAA method (Lahdelma
et al. 1998).
Let (w1, v1)∗ denote the central parameter vector obtained for negotiator 1, and let
(w2, v2)∗ denote the analogous result obtained for negotiator 2. Using (w1, v1)∗ and
(w2, v2)∗ as surrogate parameter values it is possible to compute alternatives that are
better than the reference point for both negotiators, and that maximize the mediation
criteria. In contrast to the extreme parameters approach, maximizing the minimum PoP
or criteria involving products is straightforward in the central parameters approach,
because it is only necessary to compute the respective objective function for each
alternative using one parameter vector. In addition to the optimal alternative for the
mediation criterion, the set of all other efficient solutions for the central parameter
vector can also be determined easily.
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Since the parameter vector used in this approach is only an approximation, it might
not reflect the true preferences of negotiators. Thus, it is possible that a negotiator finds
an alternative x (i) proposed by the mediator unacceptable. From such a statement, the
mediator can conclude that alternative x (i) has a lower value than the reference point
x (r) for negotiator k. This information leads to a new constraint V k(x (i)) < V k(x (r)),
which reduces the parameter sets (Wk, Vk). Using this new and smaller polytope,
new central parameters can be computed, which then can be used to generate another
proposal.
3.3 Domains Approach
The domain criterion, introduced by Starr (1962), uses the volume of a region in
parameter space in which an alternative remains optimal to indicate the sensitivity of a
solution. The use of this criterion for multi-attribute decision problems was proposed
by Charnetski and Soland (1978). SMAA methods (Lahdelma et al. 2003) are also
based on exploring the weight space in order to describe the preferences that would
make each alternative the most preferred one, or that would give a certain rank for a
specified alternative. The method proposed by Vetschera (2009) to measure the extent
to which information about the preferences is available during a negotiation is also
based on the domain criterion.
Our third approach is also based on this concept and calculates the relative volume
of the feasible set of parameter values for which some conditions are fulfilled. Let S
denote the set of feasible parameter values for the two parties given the information
currently available:
S = {(w1, v1, w2, v2) ∈ (W1, M1) × (W2, M2)}.
Let S(C˜) denote the subset of S where condition C˜ holds:
S(C˜) = {(w1, v1, w2, v2) ∈ (W1, M1) × (W2, M2) : C˜ is true}.
Let V ol(S(C˜)) denote the volume of set S(C˜) and let V ol(S) denote the volume
of set S. The expression
V ol(S(C˜))/V ol(S)
then denotes the relative volume of the subset in which condition C˜ holds as compared
to the volume of the entire feasible region. If we further assume that parameter vectors
are uniformly distributed, this ratio can be interpreted as the probability that condition
C˜ is fulfilled for any randomly drawn feasible parameter vector.
The relative volume of the parameter set in which each alternative x (i) is at least as
good as the reference for both negotiators can be computed as
V ol
(
S
(
V 1(x (i)) ≥ V 1(x (r)) ∧ V 2(x (i)) ≥ V 2(x (r))
))
/V ol(S).
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Note that this relative volume is equal to zero for alternatives that are definitely worse
than x (r), and is equal to one for alternatives that are definitely better than the reference
point. This approach therefore complements the extreme values approach by provid-
ing additional information about alternatives which are between the two extreme cases
of being definitely better or definitely worse than the reference point. It indicates the
probability that, given the preference information collected so far from the negotiators,
both negotiators will prefer alternative x (i) over the reference value.
In a similar way, the relative volume of the parameter set in which each alternative
is Pareto efficient is given by: V ol
(
S(x (i) is efficient)
)
/V ol(S).
The same approach can also be applied to the mediation criteria. The relative vol-
ume of the subset of parameter space where each alternative x (i) is optimal according
to the different mediation criteria (maximizing the sum of the values, maximizing the
minimal PoP, etc.) can in general be written as V ol (S(x (i) is optimal)) /V ol(S). For
the sum of values criterion this relative volume is:
V ol
(
S(V 1(x (i)) + V 2(x (i)) ≥ V 1(x ( j)) + V 2(x ( j)),∀ j 	= i)
)
/V ol(S).
These volumes can again be interpreted as probabilities. They thus provide a probabil-
ity distribution across alternatives indicating the possible optima. Alternatives having
zero probability will definitely not be optimal, while alternatives with a high proba-
bility of being optimal can be considered as robust solutions.
The domains approach can also be used interactively in a similar way as the central
parameters approach. If a negotiator does not accept one alternative it is possible to
redefine S by introducing a new constraint to eliminate this alternative and calculate
again the domain volumes.
As the mediator should be informed of the relative volumes of many different
results, we suggest to use Monte-Carlo simulation to approximate volumes. Exact
methods for computing volumes also exist (see, e.g., Lasserre 1983; Lawrence 1991;
Vetschera 1997), but are more computationally demanding and can be used only for
one question at a time.
The simulation generates a large number niter of random instances of the two nego-
tiators’s parameter values satisfying all the constraints. For each vector, all properties
C˜ of interest can be evaluated simultaneously, i.e. which alternatives are better than the
reference x (r) for both of the negotiators, which alternatives are efficient, and which
alternative is the best one according to each mediation criterion (as it is also possible
to analyze several mediation criteria simultaneously). Considering the results for all
these instances, it is possible to indicate, for each alternative x (i), the proportion of
instances where each of the above mentioned conditions was verified for that particular
alternative. In order to allow for (relative) volumes to be interpreted as probabilities,
a uniform distribution of parameter vectors must be used for the simulations. In the
experiments described in the next section, scaling weights were generated according
to a uniform distribution using the process described in Butler et al. (1997).
When we interpret the volumes as probabilities, it might also be interesting to com-
pute conditional probabilities, e.g., the probability that an alternative is optimal for a
mediation criterion under the condition that it is better than the reference point and
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efficient. Such conditional probabilities can also be obtained from the simulation by
recording the number of instances in which both conditions are fulfilled and calculating
p(C˜ |D˜) = p(C˜&D˜)/p(D˜) (16)
where C˜ and D˜ represent the two conditions to be analyzed.
3.4 Comparison of the Three Approaches
3.4.1 Properties
In the preceding subsections, we proposed three approaches to support a mediator who
observes a dance of the packages with incomplete information. In this subsection we
discuss properties of the presented approaches.
Since they are based on incomplete information, the models might mislead the
mediator to propose unsuitable alternatives. The first property we analyze directly
deals with the question whether an approach will support statements which are not
true in view of the actual preferences of the negotiators (e.g. whether it is possible
that an alternative will be indicated to be better than the reference value for both
negotiators, while in reality it is not).
Our methods represent different ways of handling uncertainty about preferences.
The domains approach in a way relates to decision criteria under risk like the
expected value, which explicitly take into account probabilities. The extreme parame-
ters approach could be compared to a pessimistic min-max criterion, which only looks
at the baseline which can be obtained under any circumstances.
Taking the analogy to statistical decisions under risk a step further, two kinds of
errors can be made when outcomes are uncertain: on one hand, an alternative can be
indicated as optimal or as better than another alternative while in reality it is not, and
on the other hand, the method might fail to identify an alternative which is good in
reality. All methods might lead to the second kind of error. We therefore focus our
discussion on the first kind of error, declaring an alternative erroneously as optimal.
The extreme parameters approach will compute exactly which alternatives are def-
initely better, which alternatives are possibly better, which alternatives are definitely
efficient or definitely not efficient, and will determine whether there exists an optimal
alternative for all parameter values and which alternatives might be optimal. If the
information provided by the negotiators is consistent (which we are assuming) it is
therefore not possible to obtain wrong results using the extreme parameters approach.
The central parameters approach makes statements about alternatives assuming a
central parameter vector. However, the central vector is just an approximation, which
can be a rather coarse one if information is scarce. Hence, there is no guarantee that
the supposedly better alternatives will really have higher values than the reference
point, or any of the other statements made about alternatives will really hold for the
true preference parameters.
The domains approach will compute the probabilities that each alternative is bet-
ter than the reference point for both negotiators simultaneously, the probabilities that
123
Author's personal copy
P. Sarabando et al.
Fig. 2 Original set of feasible
parameters
each alternative is efficient, and the probabilities of each alternative being optimal.
The conditions with probability equal to 0 or to 1 will correspond to conditions that
“definitely” do not hold or to conditions that “definitely” hold, respectively, and thus
correspond to exact information like the extreme parameters approach. In these cases,
the domains approach will also never be misleading. However, when some property
holds with a probability strictly between zero and one, there is the possibility that the
statement might be true or false for the true preference parameters. In particular, this
approach might be misleading to the mediator if different probabilities are attached
to different alternatives. For example, the mediator might be tempted to propose an
alternative which has the highest probability of being optimal according to some arbi-
tration criterion, while according to the true preference parameters, another alternative
(for which only a low probability is indicated) is optimal.
Therefore, according to the possibility of providing misleading results, we rank the
extreme parameters approach first, followed by the domains approach, and the central
parameters approach comes last.
When information is incomplete, there is also the possibility to obtain additional
information to improve the quality of results. One would wish that this additional infor-
mation indeed improves the quality of results. Additional information would be mis-
leading if, without the additional information, a method delivers a correct result (e.g.
indicates the truly optimal alternative to be the best one according to some arbitration
criterion), while after adding more information, the method delivers a different—and
thus wrong—result.
For simplicity, we analyze this property only for the case of unknown weights, but
results can easily be generalized to the other cases. Consider some statement which the
mediator wants to verify, e.g. that alternative x (i) is better than the reference value. The
situation before receiving additional information is depicted in Fig. 2. The polygon
represents the set of all weight vectors which are still considered as possible given
the information which the mediator has received so far. Let the true weight vector
(which is unknown to the mediator) be located at point T. The left part of the polygon
represents all parameter vectors for which the statement under consideration would
be true, the right part those parameter vectors for which the statement is false. Since
the true parameter vector is located in the left part, the statement is true in reality.
The three approaches will process this situation in the following way:
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Fig. 3 Changed set of feasible
parameters
– Since the set of feasible weight vectors contains both vectors for which the state-
ment is true and some vectors for which it is false, the extreme parameters approach
will indicate that the statement is possibly true (e.g. alternative x (i) is possibly bet-
ter than the reference level).
– In the central parameters approach, the mid-point M of the polygon is used for
evaluation. At this point, the statement is true, so the central parameters approach
will indicate the statement to be true.
– In the domains approach, the left area indicates the probability that the statement
is true, the right area the probability that the statement is false. The domains
approach will therefore indicate that the statement has a probability well over fifty
percent of being true.
Now the mediator obtains additional information about the preferences of a
negotiator, which leads to an additional constraint represented by a new line in Fig. 3.
The three approaches will process this additional information in the following way:
– Since the set of feasible parameter vectors still contains elements for which the
statement is true and elements for which the statement is false, the extreme param-
eters approach will still indicate that the statement is potentially true. In fact, since
any additional constraint that is based on the correct preferences of a negotiator
will retain the true parameter vector in the feasible set, the extreme parameters
approach will always indicate at least that the statement is possibly true. If the
constraint eliminates all parameter vectors for which the statement is false, the
statement would even be indicated as definitely true.
– In the central parameters approach, point M′ will now be used as parameter vector.
For this point, the statement is false, so this approach will now incorrectly indicate
that the statement is false.
– The domain approach will now indicate a much higher probability for the state-
ment to be false (right part of the remaining area), than for it to be true.
Thus we have shown that in the central parameters approach and in the domains
approach, additional information might be misleading in the sense that a correct answer
is obtained without the information, but a wrong answer with the additional informa-
tion. In contrast, this will never happen in the extreme parameters approach.
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The question now is whether such a situation will happen frequently, and under
which conditions such an undesirable reversal of results might occur. From Fig. 3,
it is clear that such a reversal is more likely to occur if the true parameter vector is
located close to the boundary in parameter space separating the regions in which the
statement is true and false, respectively, and at the same time it is close to the constraint
generated by the additional information.
If the true parameter vector is close to the boundary line of the statement in ques-
tion, this means that for the true parameters, the statement is not very robust. This
underlines the importance of sensitivity analysis, which should be performed to check
the robustness of any conclusions derived from our methods.
If an additional constraint is close to the true parameter vector, this indicates that the
decision on which the constraint is based is a tight one and involves two alternatives
which provide almost the same value for a negotiator. Since this additional constraint
is also close to the boundary line of the statement in questions, we might for example
have a situation in which alternative x (i) is being compared to an alternative which is
similar to the reference value as well as to x (i) itself.
In real applications, a negotiator might be hesitant to make a preference statement
about alternatives between which he is almost indifferent. Thus we can expect that such
reversals will not happen too often. But on the other hand, such preference statements
can not be completely avoided. If the mediator tries to use only preference statements
about which the negotiators are very sure, this would generate only constraints far from
the true parameter vector. Using only such constraints, it is not possible to reduce the
set of feasible parameter vectors to a region close to the true vector. A large feasi-
ble region might be sufficient in some cases, but will often not be enough to obtain
a unique solution. Our results indicate that such statements, even if they are correct
(the true parameter vector remains feasible, thus the preference statement leading to
the new line is in accordance with the true preferences) might generate misleading
results.
The simulation studies we have performed to obtain the numerical results presented
in Sect. 4 provide further insights into the effects of additional information (for more
details see Sarabando et al. 2009). On one hand, some results indicate that the infor-
mation which can be inferred from choices made during the negotiation is not enough
for reliable results, and the results can significantly be improved by adding at least
a few preference or indifference statements directly obtained from the negotiators.
On the other hand, just a few of those equivalence statements are sufficient to obtain
results which are very close to the true preferences of negotiators. Thus it seems that
one need not obtain much additional information from the negotiators.
3.4.2 User-Oriented Comparison of the Approaches
Table 1 summarizes the different intervention possibilities for a mediator, using the
three approaches, which altogether can constitute a process with three steps.
The rows of Table 1 express the complementary concerns of a mediator. A medi-
ator would like to propose an alternative likely to be accepted, hence better than the
reference point for both negotiators. Three approaches can then be used:
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Table 1 Summary of the different analyses that can be performed
Concept / approach Extreme Central Domains
Step 1:
Comparison to
reference point
in value space
1a. Identify
alternatives
which are
definitely better
than the
reference point
for both
negotiators
1′. Identify
alternatives
which are better
than the
reference point
for both
negotiators,
assuming the
central
parameter values
(LP solution or
centroid)
1′′. Find the
probability that
each alternative
is better than the
reference point
for both
negotiators
1b. Eliminate
alternatives
which are
definitely worse
than the
reference point
for at least one
negotiator
Step 2: Pareto
Efficiency
2a. Identify
alternatives
which are
definitely Pareto
efficient
2′. Identify
alternatives
which are Pareto
efficient,
assuming the
central
parameter values
(LP solution or
centroid)
2′′. Find the
probability that
each alternative
is Pareto
efficient
2b. Eliminate
alternatives
which are
definitely not
Pareto efficient
Step 3: Optimal
alternative using
mediation
criterion
3a. Identify
alternatives
which are
definitely
optimal for the
mediation
criterion (for all
parameter
vectors)
3′. Identify
alternatives
which are
optimal for the
mediation
criterion,
assuming the
central
parameter values
(LP solution or
centroid)
3′′. Find the
probability that
each alternative
is optimal for
the mediation
criterion
3b. Identify
alternatives
which might be
optimal for the
mediation
criterion (at least
for one
parameter
vector)
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– The extreme parameters approach will compute which alternatives are definitely
better than the reference point for both negotiators simultaneously (analysis 1a).
However, it might turn out that no such alternatives exist. The same approach can
be used to eliminate alternatives which are definitely worse than the reference
point for at least one negotiator (analysis 1b). The advantage of this approach
is that the conditions of being definitely better or definitely worse are exactly
determined. Its disadvantage is that it requires solving nalt LPs for each analy-
sis (where nalt represents the number of possible alternatives, i.e. the number of
different combinations of issue levels).
– The central parameters approach will find alternatives which are better than the
reference point for both negotiators simultaneously, assuming a central parameter
vector (analysis 1′). This vector can be computed solving a LP maximizing the
minimum slack or computing a centroid. An advantage of this approach is that
only two LPs need to be solved (one for each negotiator), or only two centroids
have to be computed. Another advantage is that it provides a clear-cut partition
of the alternatives set: those better than the reference, and those worse than the
reference.
– The domains approach will compute the probabilities that each alternative is better
than the reference point for both negotiators simultaneously (analysis 1′′). Some
alternatives will have zero or a very low probability and might be discarded from
further analysis. The advantage of this approach is that it is straightforward to
compute the probabilities using Monte-Carlo simulation, with a confidence level
as high as needed (it is a matter of how many iterations are used for the simulation).
Its disadvantage is that the result will not be as clear cut as in the previous case.
Concerning the second row of Table 1, a mediator would like to propose an alter-
native on the Pareto efficient frontier. Again, the same three approaches can be used:
– The extreme parameters approach will compute exactly which alternatives are
definitely efficient (analysis 2a), or definitely not efficient (analysis 2b), allowing
to eliminate the latter. Its disadvantage is that it requires solving 2∗nalt ∗(nalt −1)
LPs for each analysis (this is a worst case bound, because as soon as an alterna-
tive is deemed definitely inefficient, it is no longer necessary to include it in the
subsequent comparisons). The advantage of this approach is that the conditions
of being definitely efficient or definitely inefficient are exactly determined.
– The central parameters approach will find which alternatives are efficient, assum-
ing a central parameter vector computed solving an LP or computing a centroid
(analysis 2′). An advantage of this approach is that only two LPs or centroid com-
putations are needed. It also provides a clear-cut partition of the alternatives set
between efficient and inefficient ones.
– The domains approach will compute the probabilities that each alternative is effi-
cient (analysis 2′′). Alternatives with a very low probability of being efficient
might be discarded from further analysis. The advantage and the disadvantage are
the same as for analysis 1′′.
Finally, concerning the third row of Table 1, a mediator could have the requirement
of proposing an efficient alternative that would be optimal according to a mediation
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criterion such as the sum of the values (pursuing maximal enlargement of the pie) or
the minimum PoP (pursuing equity):
– The extreme parameters approach will indicate if there exists an optimal alternative
for all parameter values (analysis 3a), which is not very likely, and will determine
which alternatives might be optimal (analysis 3b). As an advantage, the conditions
of being definitely optimal or potentially optimal are exactly determined. How-
ever, the most likely result will be a set of potentially optimal alternatives, with no
way of knowing which one is better. Furthermore, the use of linear programming
is limited to the case where the mediation criterion is the sum of values.
– The central parameters approach will find the optimal alternative, assuming a
central parameter vector (analysis 3′). An advantage of this approach is that a
single alternative will be identified (except for rare cases where multiple alterna-
tive optima might exist). A second advantage is that the mediation criterion does
not have to be linear, the minimum PoP as a mediation criterion, or a criterion
involving products, can also be computed easily for a given parameter vector.
– The domains approach will compute the probabilities of each alternative being
optimal (analysis 3′′). Alternatives with a very low probability of being optimal
might be discarded from further analysis. The advantage of this approach is that
by using Monte-Carlo simulation, probabilities for several mediation clriteria can
be computed simultaneously and also non-linear criteria can be used. A clear cut
result is not very likely, but this analysis provides more information than analysis
3b, because it also includes probabilities.
All the presented approaches provide interesting and diversified results. The choice
of the approaches to be used depends on the mediator’s goals, but we suggest to use
different approaches complementarily in sequence.
The mediator can start by finding alternatives that both negotiators would con-
sider to be an improvement relatively to the reference point. This implies eliminating
alternatives which are definitely worse than the reference for at least one negotiator
(analysis 1b), or which have only a very low probability of being better than the ref-
erence for both negotiators (analysis 1′′). In a second step, the mediator can eliminate
alternatives that are definitely inefficient (analysis 2b) or very unlikely to be efficient
(analysis 2′′), the latter approach being preferable if there remain many alternatives.
To detect efficiency, each of the alternatives that was not eliminated in the previous
step would be compared with the original set of alternatives. Finally, to choose a single
alternative to propose to both negotiators, the mediator can use analysis 3′ to propose
the optimal solution using central parameters, or use analysis 3′′ to pick the alternative
that is optimal with highest probability. For this purpose, more than one mediation
criterion can be considered.
As referred previously, this integrated approach can be used interactively. If the
alternative proposed by the mediator is accepted, the negotiation ends successfully.
However, it can happen that the alternative proposed by the mediator is not accepted
by one negotiator (or both). If a negotiator k states that a proposed solution x (p) is
not better than the reference x (r), the constraint V k(x (p)) < V k(x (r)) can be added to
the definition of (Wk, Mk). The analysis can then be repeated to find a new solution.
It might happen that a negotiator was insincere (acting strategically) when stating
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that x (p) is not better than the reference, hoping that a better alternative will pro-
posed by the mediator. However, since the mediator will incorporate the constraint
V k(x (p)) < V k(x (r)), which is contrary to the negotiator’s true preferences, the nego-
tiator’s true parameter vector will be excluded from the feasible region. It therefore
might happen that the following alternatives proposed will not be as good as the pre-
vious one. For this reason, it is likely that manipulation attempts will eventually harm
the negotiator who tried to manipulate the process.
Although the columns of Table 1 show three different approaches, they can all be
performed in one single Monte-Carlo simulation. Indeed, Monte-Carlo simulation can
be used to compute probabilities (relative domains) for different conditions with high
accuracy, depending on the number of parameter vectors in the sample. Averaging
the feasible parameter across all iterations will provide an accurate approximation of
the centroid of (W1, M1) and (W2, M2), which can be used in the central parameters
approach. Simulation experiments with a large number of parameter vectors will also
provide a good approximation of the extreme parameters approach, however, exact
results can only be obtained by solving the corresponding LP problems.
4 Illustrative Example
4.1 Introduction
To illustrate the approaches presented in the last section, let us consider an example
introduced by Raiffa (2002). In this example, there are two parties in a negotiation:
Nelson and Amstore. Nelson has a construction firm and he negotiates with a retail
chain (Amstore) to build a new store for them. There are three issues: price (10, 10.5,
11, 11.5 or 12 thousand dollars), design (basic or improved) and time (20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25 or 26 days). Combining these issue levels yields a total of 70 possible alterna-
tives (see Table 2). Nelson wants to maximize the issues price and time and prefers
basic over improved design, while Amstore has the opposite preferences. Therefore,
the most preferred alternative for Amstore is alternative 1, whereas the most preferred
alternative for Nelson is alternative 70. The sequence of proposals and the compromise
eventually reached (alternative 44) are depicted in Fig. 4.
In this illustration, we consider only the mediation criterion of maximizing the sum
of the values. Among the efficient alternatives that are better than the compromise
for both parties, alternative 39 is the best one, with a sum of values equal to 136.
Alternative 25 also has the same total value, but it is not better for both parties than
the compromise solution. Therefore, a mediator having complete information would
propose alternative 39 to the parties.
Let us now consider the analysis of a mediator who knows the available alterna-
tives (Table 2) and witnesses the sequence of proposals, but does not know the exact
parameter values of each negotiator displayed in Table 3. The sequence of proposals
originates constraints of type (6). To illustrate the use of explicit preference informa-
tion (namely, constraints of type (7)), suppose that Nelson indicates that alternative 25
is as good as alternative 36, and alternative 39 is as good as alternative 50. Let us also
assume that Amstore provides the information that alternatives 50 and 42 as well as
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Table 2 Alternatives
Alt. Price Design Time Alt. Price Design Time Alt. Price Design Time
1 10 Imp. 20 25 10.5 Basic 23 49 11.5 Imp. 26
2 10 Imp. 21 26 10.5 Basic 24 50 11.5 Basic 20
3 10 Imp. 22 27 10.5 Basic 25 51 11.5 Basic 21
4 10 Imp. 23 28 10.5 Basic 26 52 11.5 Basic 22
5 10 Imp. 24 29 11 Imp. 20 53 11.5 Basic 23
6 10 Imp. 25 30 11 Imp. 21 54 11.5 Basic 24
7 10 Imp. 26 31 11 Imp. 22 55 11.5 Basic 25
8 10 Basic 20 32 11 Imp. 23 56 11.5 Basic 26
9 10 Basic 21 33 11 Imp. 24 57 12 Imp. 20
10 10 Basic 22 34 11 Imp. 25 58 12 Imp. 21
11 10 Basic 23 35 11 Imp. 26 59 12 Imp. 22
12 10 Basic 24 36 11 Basic 20 60 12 Imp. 23
13 10 Basic 25 37 11 Basic 21 61 12 Imp. 24
14 10 Basic 26 38 11 Basic 22 62 12 Imp. 25
15 10.5 Imp. 20 39 11 Basic 23 63 12 Imp. 26
16 10.5 Imp. 21 40 11 Basic 24 64 12 Basic 20
17 10.5 Imp. 22 41 11 Basic 25 65 12 Basic 21
18 10.5 Imp. 23 42 11 Basic 26 66 12 Basic 22
19 10.5 Imp. 24 43 11.5 Imp. 20 67 12 Basic 23
20 10.5 Imp. 25 44 11.5 Imp. 21 68 12 Basic 24
21 10.5 Imp. 26 45 11.5 Imp. 22 69 12 Basic 25
22 10.5 Basic 20 46 11.5 Imp. 23 70 12 Basic 26
23 10.5 Basic 21 47 11.5 Imp. 24
24 10.5 Basic 22 48 11.5 Imp. 25
alternatives 36 and 37 are roughly equivalent. We decided to use c = 5 in (5) so that
the real values belong to the interval with the linear function as lower limit and the
concave function as upper limit, but without considering that value functions could be
extremely concave. For the constraints of type (7) we used  = 10.
4.2 Comparison of the Recommendations Provided by the Different Approaches
In the example, we consider only the recommendations that would be given by the
mediator in the first step, without interactive refinement. The results obtained assum-
ing known value functions are presented in Table 4, results assuming unknown value
functions in Table 5. For our calculations, we used constraints of type (6)+(7). Con-
sidering the central approach we present the results obtained solving the LPs. The
results for the domains approach were obtained using 5,000 iterations in a Monte
Carlo simulation.
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Fig. 4 Dance of the packages
Table 3 Complete information
Issue Partial value Value * 100
Level Nelson Amstore Nelson Amstore
Price 10 0 1 0 70
10.5 0.41667 0.85714 25 60
11 0.66667 0.64286 40 45
11.5 0.91667 0.35714 55 25
12 1 0 60 0
w1 0.6 0.7
Design Basic 1 0 20 0
Improved 0 1 0 10
w2 0.2 0.1
Time 20 0 1 0 20
21 0.4 0.95 8 19
22 0.6 0.9 12 18
23 0.75 0.8 15 16
24 0.85 0.6 17 12
25 0.95 0.35 19 7
26 1 0 20 0
w3 0.2 0.2
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These tables:
– show the probabilities obtained in the domains approach (probability of being
better for both parties than the compromise solution, probability of being efficient
and probability of being the best according the criterion of maximizing the sum
of the values);
– indicate if one alternative is possibly / definitely better than the compromise solu-
tion for both negotiators, possibly / definitely efficient and possibly / definitely
the best one according the criterion of maximizing the sum of the values;
– present the results considering the central parameters approach (indicating if this
approach indicates or not an alternative as being better than the compromise for
both negotiators, of being efficient and of maximizing the sum of the values).
In these tables, one can observe the difference between a simulation approach and
the exact solution of LP models in the extreme parameters approach. Theoretically, an
alternative should be definitely better than the compromise exactly if the probability
of being better than the compromise is one. But since probabilities are obtained via
simulation with a finite number of parameter vectors, it is possible that for some alter-
natives, the probability is estimated to be one, while the exact solution of the LP model
still indicates that it is not better for some parameter vectors and thus it is not definitely
better. This was the case for alternatives 38 and 40 in Table 4. The tables also show
the possibility that the central parameters approach generates misleading results. For
example, alternative 41 is indicated as being better than the compromise, although the
domain approach reveals that the probability of this property is only about 65%.
Considering known values (but unknown weights), in all the approaches, the media-
tor should recommend alternative 39. Alternative 39 is in reality better for both parties
than the compromise solution and it is efficient. Considering value functions with
unknown parameters, and using the extreme parameters approach, it is only possi-
ble to recommend a set of 15 alternatives that can be better for both parties than the
compromise solution, can be efficient and can maximize the sum of the values. Con-
sidering the central approach it is possible to recommend alternative 38 (after using
the approach interactively), in the criterion maximizing the sum of the values. This
alternative is in reality better for both parties than the compromise solution and effi-
cient. Considering the domains approach, if the objective is to maximize the sum of
the values the mediator should suggest alternatives 26 and 27 (both alternatives are
efficient, but alternative 26 is not better for Nelson than the compromise solution).
Table 6 summarizes the results of the three approaches to facilitate their comparison.
Figure 5 shows the positions of these solutions in value space. The comparison to
the reference point helps to eliminate a large fraction of the alternatives, even in the
case of unknown value functions. The difference between the two information levels
becomes more important in the analysis of efficient solutions. In the case of unknown
values, both the domain approach and the central parameters approach indicate several
alternatives as efficient and better than the compromise, which in fact do not dominate
the compromise. One of those alternatives is even inefficient. Similarly, when comput-
ing the optimal alternative according to the sum of values criterion, many inadequate
alternatives would be indicated as possibly optimal for the case of unknown values.
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Table 6 Summary of solutions obtained
Concept Information Extreme Central Domains
Comparison to
reference point
in value space
Known values Definitely: 39 38–41 25–28, 37–41
Definitely not:
1–11, 15–21,
29–32, 43–49,
51–70
Unknown values Definitely: none 24–28, 37–38 25–28, 37–41
Definitely not:
1–8, 15–20,
29–32, 43,
45–49, 51–70
Pareto efficiency Known values Definitely: none 38–41 25–26, 38–41 (1),
27 (0.9724), 37
(0.5592)
Definitely not: 13,
14, 34–36, 50
Unknown values Definitely: none 24–28 25 (0.9638),
Definitely not: none 26 (0.9550),
27 (0.9140),
28 (0.6636),
39 (0.6256),
40 (0.7890),
41 (0.8728)
Optimal
alternative using
the sum criterion
Known values Definitely: none 39 25 (0.5856),
Definitely not: 12,
22–28, 33,
37–42
39 (0.3814)
Unknown values Definitely: none 24 26 (0.2240)
Definitely not:
9–14, 21–28,
33–42, 50
27 (0.2583)
Mediator Known values Alternative 39 Alternative 39 Alternative 39
Recommendation Unknown values Not conclusive Alternative 24 Alt. 26 or 27
For more detailed results, we refer to Sarabando et al. (2009), where we also show
some results concerning the case that no compromise is reached.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have addressed three ways to deal with incomplete information in
the context of negotiations:
1. the extreme parameters approach,
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2. the central parameters approach, and
3. the domains approach,
and analyzed how they can be applied to different levels of information that might be
available about the preferences of negotiators.
The three methods we have discussed reflect two important trade-offs in dealing
with incomplete information. The first trade-off, which can best be illustrated by com-
paring the extreme parameters approach to the domains approach, can be labeled as
ambiguity versus lack of universality. The domains approach generates only probabil-
ity statements, which sometimes can be rather vague and might be hard to interpret.
This contrasts with the very clear statements generated by the extreme parameters
approach. If an alternative is definitely better than another alternative according to
the extreme parameters approach, there is no doubt how the two alternatives are to be
seen, while the domains approach might create statements like there is a 55 percent
probability that one alternative x (i) is better than another alternative x ( j). However, the
advantage of the extreme parameters approach in terms of lower ambiguity comes at
a price: the domains approach is able to generate a (probabilistic) statement about any
two alternatives, the extreme parameters approach might be unable to state whether
one alternative is definitely better than the other or vice versa.
The central parameters approach overcomes this dilemma. It will always deliver
a unique result, but does so by ignoring much of the information that is available
and focusing only on one out of possibly many possible parameter vectors. Thus, it
illustrates another important trade-off between information richness and uniqueness
of results. Figure 6 illustrates this relationship.
The two dimensions represented in Fig. 6 represent trade-offs, both ends of these
axes have their advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, there is no method which
is clearly better than the others, all methods have their particular strengths and weak-
nesses, which make them suitable for some tasks.
We therefore argue for a mix of methods, which should preferably be implemented
in the form of an interactive process. The first step of such a process consists in a pre-
selection of alternatives based on the extreme parameters approach. Depending on the
purpose of the analysis, further choice between these alternatives can be based on the
central parameters approach to obtain specific results, or on the domains approach to
better exploit the rich, but potentially ambiguous information available. This integra-
tion can probably best be achieved using simulation methods, which make it possible
to follow a central parameters approach and a domains approach simultaneously.
While our study has led to some interesting results concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of the methods we studied, it also has several limitations which indi-
cate the need for future research. This future research can follow two different direc-
tions. The first direction concerns theoretical developments to strengthen the foun-
dations of the methods we have proposed and better delineate the possible areas of
application for each method. The second is directed towards implementation and
empirical investigation of these methods in a realistic context.
The main focus of our research was on finding solutions which provide a Pareto-
improvement over a proposed compromise, or even maximize the total payoff to both
negotiators. This kind of improvement is only possible if the negotiation problem has
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Fig. 5 Distribution of solutions in utility space
some integrative potential at all, in a purely distributive negotiation, no such improve-
ments are possible. It would therefore be important for the negotiators, as well as for
a mediator, to know at a very early stage of the negotiation whether such integra-
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Fig. 6 Trade-offs between approaches to deal with incomplete information in negotiations
tive potential exists at all. Of course, even for this purpose, some information on the
preferences of negotiators is required. Our research could thus be extended towards
identifying the minimal amount of information on preferences that would allow to
identify whether the negotiation is integrative at all.
Since our methods rely on information about preferences, the quality of this infor-
mation is also an important issue. In this paper, we have assumed that all information
obtained from negotiators either implicitly or explicitly is consistent and reflects the
same true value function of a negotiator. But in reality, negotiators might not behave
(make offers, accept offers) in a way fully consistent with the model assumptions, or
they might provide inconsistent information when explicitly asked about their prefer-
ences. It is therefore necessary to extend our methods to deal with such inconsistencies.
Inconsistencies in the responses of negotiators might be the result of an error, but
they might also be the result of deliberate manipulation. In particular when our meth-
ods are used by a mediator to suggest potential agreements to negotiators, or even
by an arbitrator to calculate a binding solution, there are incentives for parties for
strategic misrepresentation of their preferences. While the complexity of the calcula-
tions involved would make it difficult for negotiators to manipulate their answers in
an optimal way, parties could nevertheless successfully try to improve their situation
even by simplistic methods (Vetschera 2005). These possibilities and their impact on
the quality of results also need to be analyzed.
While some of these questions can perhaps be answered using analytical methods,
the complexity of the relationships will in many cases probably require computational
experiments. In this paper, we have applied our methods only to one single case for
illustrative purposes. A thorough analysis of the impact which the choice of different
methods, and variants of one method, have on the results requires a larger empirical
basis. Such a basis can come from simulation studies with artificial data, but will
also require applications of the methods to real data from (experimental) negotiations.
Such studies can help to identify conditions under which the different methods lead
to different solutions, and to explore how the choice of methods will influence final
outcomes.
123
Author's personal copy
P. Sarabando et al.
Apart from these theoretical and empirical developments, further work is needed
to foster the practical application of our methods. This includes the development of
actual scenarios for their use. While we have discussed the use of the proposed meth-
ods mainly as tools for a mediator or arbitrator in the present paper, this is not the only
setting in which our proposed methods could be useful: they could also be applied as
tools in an asymmetric setting for the support of one party in a negotiation. Of course,
in such a setting the quality of information available about the preferences of the two
parties will be different, since a negotiator could provide quite exact information about
his or her own preferences, but would be restricted to information implicitly obtained
from observed behavior concerning the preferences of the opponent. Application of
our method in such a setting would also require different objective functions to pursue
the interests of one party rather than to provide fair solutions in terms of the concepts
discussed here. However, the general methodology could also be applied in such a
setting.
Eventually, this work should lead to the development of a support system for medi-
ators that helps them in proposing compromise solutions. For an interactive system,
computational aspects are also important. We propose the use of Monte Carlo meth-
ods, which require the evaluation of many randomly generated parameter vectors.
However, we do not foresee problems in embedding this approach into an interactive
system for two reasons: First, the problems only require the evaluation of utility func-
tion for given parameter values and alternatives, so the total computational load is not
that large. Second, since the same operations must be performed for many parameter
vectors, the simulation can easily be distributed across several processors to decrease
response time.
Embedding the proposed approaches into a user-friendly support system is also
a prerequisite for testing the acceptability of the methods by users. There is some
empirical evidence that negotiators are reluctant to accept solutions proposed by an
automated system, even if it would improve their situation (Kersten and Noronha
1998; Korhonen et al. 1998). Thus it is not clear how negotiators would react to the
proposals generated by our methods. This could also be a topic of future empirical
research aimed at transforming the theoretical concepts introduced here into practical
tools for actual negotiations.
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